Polish-Belarusian dialogue: “We can try to build trust, but without illusions”

24/09/2026 - 17:55

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya / @anna.krasulina

The Belarusian regime can ensure that migrants do not storm the border with Poland. It can warn that Russian drones are heading towards its neighbours. But what else?

The head of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry, Maxim Ryzhenkov, recently met with his Polish counterpart Radosław Sikorski on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. What were the goals of this meeting? We discussed this with Polish journalist and Eastern Europe expert Michał Potocki for Euroradio's programme "Senses of the Day".

— What are Polish political scientists saying about Sikorski's "snowdrop diplomacy" and his meeting with Ryzhankow in New York?

— The reactions depend on whom you read — the rivals or the supporters of the current government. But the critics have a strong argument. We have tried to negotiate with the Lukashenka regime many times. If we look at the recent attempts, we notice the same mistake. We have approached agreements without honest preparation.

I have nothing against the idea of dialogue. But Belarus is in such close cooperation with Russia, which has already begun to escalate the cold war against Poland, that starting a dialogue with Belarus today is risky. Because Belarus will, one way or another, be included in the escalation against Europe.

So we can negotiate some specific steps. You do something — we do something in return, because as long as the level of trust is zero, it is impossible to negotiate any systemic resets or systemic normalisation. And so the assessment of whether it is good or bad to meet with Ryzhankow in New York depends on the level of preparation and on what goals we have set for ourselves.

The critics of this meeting speak of naivety. If we are taking a path that we already walked in 2010 with this same minister, that is bad. But I hope that Radosław Sikorski remembers the mistakes he made in 2010, because, in addition to meeting with Ryzhankow, he also met with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and representatives of the democratic forces. Time will tell.

But if we approach this more rationally, we may be able to get some minor things. But I am sceptical.

— What might Poland's goals be?

— The first and main one is to gauge how much we can conduct a dialogue in a situation of anticipated escalation. Belarus can do what it did in September 2025 — contact us upon learning that drones are heading for Poland. Or they may not do so, as was the case when drones recently flew towards Lithuania. Alternatively, the regime can ensure that the migration crisis does not return to the border with Poland.

What is happening now is an attempt to build basic trust, which is not yet there. The meetings that Andrzej Poczobut held in Belarus are perhaps the first moment since 2020 when some independent meetings have taken place in what is practically an official capacity. This means there is a willingness on the part of the regime to offer something as well.

But I have no sense that this will lead to systemic normalisation. Simply by logic, this cannot happen while escalation on Russia's part is ongoing.

— The Belarusian democratic forces seem very dissatisfied with this step. Pavel Latushka repeated the famous Polish phrase: "Nothing about us without us." So is now the time to talk with the regime?

— Pavel Latushka is right when he says this is a legitimisation of the regime. And that is what the regime has sought for a long time — some kind of meeting at the ministerial level. Yes, legitimisation has occurred.

But Sikorski, as I noted, demonstratively met with representatives of the democratic forces both before and after the meeting with Ryzhankow. So the principle of "nothing about you without you" has been upheld.

The question of whether now is the right time for negotiations is a very rational one. Yes, Lukashenka is participating in preparations for the escalation of Russia's hybrid war against Europe. But something has been done nonetheless.
The migration crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border has stopped — not on the EU-Belarusian border — and Poczobut is free. And not only was he deported to Poland, but he was also able to travel to Belarus.
So I see nothing irrational in taking steps towards building trust, as long as one does not also build illusions. If we have no illusions, we can try to do something, but not respond to the regime's situational steps with systemic steps of our own.

If we were to lift sanctions in exchange for a step the regime could walk back within a few days, that would be a mistake. Because it is easy to lift sanctions, but difficult to return to them when the need arises. So situational steps should be met with situational steps.

— Is the Polish-Belarusian track part of a larger deal between the Americans and Lukashenka?

— There is probably some connection, if only because the release of Andrzej Poczobut took place within the framework of American negotiations, not Polish-Belarusian ones. We did not manage it — the Americans did. And this is a signal that the Belarusian regime does not want a systemic reset. If they had wanted to take some major step, then we would have been able to free Poczobut several months earlier.